<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:wikidot="http://www.wikidot.com/rss-namespace">

	<channel>
		<title>DOCX the perfect vehicle for viruses?</title>
		<link>http://noooxml.wikidot.com/forum/t-74155/docx-the-perfect-vehicle-for-viruses</link>
		<description>Posts in the discussion thread &quot;DOCX the perfect vehicle for viruses?&quot; - BoycottNovell is pointing to a possible flaw in writing OLE objects in DOCX files, which could be the perfect vehicle for spreading viruses. Anyone has good OLE experience to make a proof-of-concept?</description>
				<copyright></copyright>
		<lastBuildDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 00:47:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
		
					<item>
				<guid>http://noooxml.wikidot.com/forum/t-74155#post-219669</guid>
				<title>Re: DOCX the perfect vehicle for viruses?</title>
				<link>http://noooxml.wikidot.com/forum/t-74155/docx-the-perfect-vehicle-for-viruses#post-219669</link>
				<description></description>
				<pubDate>Sun, 13 Jul 2008 22:32:38 +0000</pubDate>
				<wikidot:authorName>nunnn2</wikidot:authorName>				<wikidot:authorUserId>165856</wikidot:authorUserId>				<content:encoded>
					<![CDATA[
						 <p>Well from a programming standpoint there's no good reason why DOCX would be more susceptible than DOC. It's just a container for the same OLE data. There may well be a bug in Microsoft Office's handling of OLE in DOCX but that could be closed, so really this is about a possible discovery of a current bug in Microsoft Office.</p> <p>“I haven’t tried this, and I don’t know if it will work. I’m not sure how hard it would be to make it work.&quot;</p> <p>But that's the whole crux of the matter. It might be that his machine was compromised via a DOCX but it's unfortunately just speculation without an example. Someone should ask Rex Ballard for more info.</p> <p>Are OLE files available via OPC reference conventions? If not then this post <a href="http://www.robweir.com/blog/2008/03/ooxml-macros-and-security.html">http://www.robweir.com/blog/2008/03/ooxml-macros-and-security.html</a> might have some implications for OLE too. That would be more fundamental.</p> 
				 	]]>
				</content:encoded>							</item>
					<item>
				<guid>http://noooxml.wikidot.com/forum/t-74155#post-219658</guid>
				<title>DOCX the perfect vehicle for viruses?</title>
				<link>http://noooxml.wikidot.com/forum/t-74155/docx-the-perfect-vehicle-for-viruses#post-219658</link>
				<description></description>
				<pubDate>Sun, 13 Jul 2008 22:04:57 +0000</pubDate>
				<wikidot:authorName>zoobab</wikidot:authorName>				<wikidot:authorUserId>2946</wikidot:authorUserId>				<content:encoded>
					<![CDATA[
						 <p>BoycottNovell is <a href="http://boycottnovell.com/2008/07/12/ooxml-security-issues/">pointing to a possible flaw</a> in writing OLE objects in DOCX files, which could be the perfect vehicle for spreading viruses. Anyone has good OLE experience to make a proof-of-concept?</p> <p>Here is the original post on the <a href="http://groups.google.be/group/comp.os.linux.advocacy/msg/641a682a62745cfc?hl=fr">newsgroup comp.os.linux.advocacy</a>:</p> <blockquote> <p>Message-ID: &lt;<span class="wiki-email">moc.spuorgelgoog.xsh0002g52|9a63dbe8843e-e9e9-5174-7e9d-96166a13#moc.spuorgelgoog.xsh0002g52|9a63dbe8843e-e9e9-5174-7e9d-96166a13</span>&gt;<br /> From: Rex Ballard &lt;<span class="wiki-email">moc.liamg|drallab.xer#moc.liamg|drallab.xer</span>&gt;<br /> Newsgroups: comp.os.linux.advocacy<br /> Subject: Re: Leaked ISO Document Reveals Crooked ISO Amid MS OOXML Corruptions<br /> Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2008&#160;08:20:23 -0700 (PDT)</p> <p>[…]</p> <p>ODF is a comprehensive document that provides detailed specifications<br /> from the high level document content down to the smallest elements of<br /> scalable vector graphics. There are some “standard” mime object types<br /> that are supported, such as PNG and JPEG, but other embedded formats<br /> must be installed using plug-ins which have to be authenticated by the<br /> user and by the system at installation time, and cannot be installed<br /> by the content. Furthermore, the installed content can easily be<br /> identified as trustworthy or not, and can be restricted in it’s<br /> capabilities.</p> <p>OpenXML on the other hand, is a high-level specification which<br /> describes the high level envelopes used to embed binary objects which<br /> are included in the content. The content itself contains the binary<br /> code which can call any function in any Microsoft library and has all<br /> permissions of the person opening the document. If a user account is<br /> set up as “Administrator”, then the application can mess with the<br /> registry, create, download, and hide files, can execute applications<br /> in those files, can install any number of new viruses, and generally<br /> wreak havoc on the system.</p> <p>I’ll leave it to others to document the exact details (as I said, I’m<br /> busy these days), but I’m sure anyone who tries to publish these<br /> vulnerabilites will probably find themselves getting the same<br /> treatment that Tracy Reed of Ultraviolet.org got when he tried to<br /> publish his warnings about ActiveX controls back in 1997. Microsoft<br /> got a court injunction against him, and forced him to take down the<br /> content, claiming that it was being used to encourage hacking, and was<br /> damaging the Microsoft brand.</p> <p>“I got a couple of docx documents and had trouble getting them to open, even with the plug-in for Office XP. Next thing I know, I get a notice from my registry auditor that I have 1300 new registry errors.”Over the last 10 years,<br /> we’ve seen these very same techniques, documented back in 1997,used widely to spread viruses including<br /> Melissa, Nimda, Sky, BugBear, and about<br /> 250,000 other viruses, worms,<br /> and malware, not including spy-ware and<br /> other “Microsoft Authorized”<br /> invasions of our privacy.</p> <p>I got a couple of docx documents and had trouble getting them to open,<br /> even with the plug-in for Office XP. Next thing I know, I get a<br /> notice from my registry auditor that I have 1300 new registry errors.<br /> <strong>And suddenly, my PC is churning the disk-drive and the network</strong><br /> <strong>connection at 3:00 AM (I’m getting old and have to get up), and the</strong><br /> <strong>network shows that I’m uploading something at full speed, even though</strong><br /> <strong>my computer is supposedly sleeping.</strong></p> <p>It isn’t a back-up program that I’m running.</p> <p>I would encourage COLA readers and OSS advocates to explore this in<br /> more detail.</p> <p><strong>get someone with Office 2007 to send you a docx file.</strong><br /> <strong>unzip it using pkzip or winzip or unzip.</strong></p> <p>look at the binary files.</p> <p><strong>replace one binary object with another.</strong></p> <p><strong>zip up the document,</strong></p> <p><strong>see if your office-2007 user can read the “enhanced” document.</strong></p> <p><strong>For those of you with OLE programming skills, create an OLE object</strong><br /> <strong>that creates a file, and e-mails that file to you using smtp.</strong></p> <p>Send a document with this new ole object embedded (along with the<br /> others) and see if you get an e-mail.</p> <p>I haven’t tried this, and I don’t know if it will work. I’m not sure<br /> how hard it would be to make it work. I just think it might be an<br /> interesting project worth investigating, especially if you are<br /> considering the migration of a few thousand users to Vista and Office<br /> 2007.</p> <p>I’d love to see what the results turn out to be. After all, if it’s<br /> that easy to take control of a recipient’s machine just by sending<br /> them a “trusted” Word, Excel, or PowerPoint attachment, just think how<br /> much chaos a really aggressive malicious hacker, with a goal of<br /> obtaining marketable information about your business, could do.</p> </blockquote> 
				 	]]>
				</content:encoded>							</item>
				</channel>
</rss>